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PAPER

Special Section on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communication Systems

An Authentication Framework for Wireless Sensor Networks using
Identity-Based Signatures: Implementation and Evaluation∗
Rehana YASMIN†a) , Eike RITTER†b) , and Guilin WANG††c) ,

SUMMARY
In Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), authentication is a
crucial security requirement to avoid attacks against secure communication, and to mitigate against DoS attacks exploiting the limited resources of
sensor nodes. Resource constraints of sensor nodes are hurdles in applying
strong public key cryptographic based mechanisms in WSNs. To address
the problem of authentication in WSNs, we propose an efficient and secure
framework for authenticated broadcast/multicast by sensor nodes as well
as for outside user authentication, which utilizes identity based cryptography and online/offline signature (OOS) schemes. The primary goals of this
framework are to enable all sensor nodes in the network, firstly, to broadcast
and/or multicast an authenticated message quickly; secondly, to verify the
broadcast/multicast message sender and the message contents; and finally,
to verify the legitimacy of an outside user. This paper reports the implementation and experimental evaluation of the previously proposed authenticated
broadcast/multicast by sensor nodes scheme using online/offline signature
on TinyOS and MICA2 sensor nodes.
key words: Wireless Sensor Network, Authentication, Online/Offline Signatures

1.

Introduction

Authentication in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) can be
divided into three categories, namely base station to sensor
nodes, sensor nodes to sensor nodes, and outside users to
sensor nodes. The problem of authenticated broadcast by
the base station has been widely addressed [1]–[4]. We focus on the other two categories, i.e., the authenticated broadcast by the sensor nodes and the outside user authentication.
To handle these two problems, we proposed an authentication framework for WSNs in [5] using Identity(ID)based Cryptography [6] and Online/Offline Signature
(OOS) [7] schemes. This framework is comprised of
two authentication schemes; quick authenticated broadcast/multicast by sensor nodes and outside user authentication. The first scheme allows every sensor node in the network to broadcast or multicast authenticated messages very
quickly without the involvement of the base station. All potential receivers can verify a message sent by any sender
node in the network. It also allows sensor nodes on the
path from the sender node to the receivers to verify a valid
message and drop false injected data. The second scheme
enables all sensor nodes in the network to verify the legit† The
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imacy of any outside user without storing any user specific
information. It allows a maximum possible number of legitimate users to access data from sensor nodes in a secure way.
This scheme first authenticates a user and then establishes a
session key for the secure exchange of user queries and sensor nodes data. The proposed framework uses an ID-based
Online/Offline Signature (IBOOS) (an ID-based version of
OOS) for the first scheme and an ID-based Signature (IBS)
for the second scheme.
In this paper, we present our implementation and evaluation details of a few suitable IBOOS schemes on TinyOS
operating system and MICA2 [8] sensor nodes. To the best
of our knowledge, the proposed framework [5] was the first
proposal of using IBOOS schemes in WSNs at that time. A
detailed discussion about security and performance of applying an IBOOS scheme in WSNs is already given in [5]
leaving implementation of IBOOS on sensor nodes as a future work. From implementation, we aimed to find the answers to the following questions; 1) whether it is possible
for a typical resource constrained sensor node processor to
compute an IBOOS scheme, 2) how efficient is to compute
an IBOOS scheme on sensor nodes in terms of resource consumption. We evaluated the IBOOS schemes with respect
to the computation cost, memory usage, and signature size.
Our implementation results confirm the suitability of our
proposed authenticated broadcast by sensor nodes scheme
using IBOOS for resource constrained sensor nodes.
1.1

ID-based Online/Offline Signature (IBOOS)

An Online/Offline Signature (OOS) scheme divides the process of message signing into two phases, the Offline phase
and the Online phase. The Offline phase is performed before
the message to be signed becomes available. This phase performs most of the computations of signature generation and
results in a partial signature. Once the message is known,
the Online phase starts. This phase retrieves the partial
signature calculated during the Offline phase and performs
some minor quick computations to obtain the final signature. The Online phase is assumed to be very fast consisting of small computations while the Offline phase can be
performed by any other resourceful device. IBOOS is the
ID-based version of OOS, where a message signed with a
signer’s private key is verified using the signer’s ID. In IDbased cryptography [6], the signer’s private key corresponding to his ID is generated by a private key generator (PKG).
IBOOS enables a resource constrained device like a sensor
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node to sign a message quickly, once it has some critical
event to report. Moreover, some IBOOS schemes, like [9],
allow to reuse the partial signature computed in the offline
phase to sign more than one message, which decreases the
energy consumption on sensor nodes.
1.2

Motivations

There are many critical situations where a sensor node needs
to broadcast or multicast a quick message. Consider the military application scenario discussed in [10], where a troop
of soldiers needs to move through a battlefield. Sensor
nodes deployed there detect the presence of the enemy and
broadcast this information authentically as soon as possible
throughout the network. Soldiers, passing near these sensor
nodes, use this information to strategically position themselves in the battlefield. In a forest fire alarm application
[10], sensor nodes deployed in a forest immediately inform
authorities about the event and the exact location of the event
before the fire spreads uncontrollably. The receiver of these
messages may be a powerful device or another sensor node
in the network. Message authentication is required for all
these applications otherwise an adversary can exploit the situation and send a fake message, for instance, regarding the
location of the enemy or cause a fake fire alarm [5].
However, the problem of authenticated broadcast or
multicast by the sensor nodes has not been addressed by the
existing authentication schemes for WSNs. Symmetric authentication schemes for WSNs, for instance, µ TESLA [1]
and its variations, use Message Authentication Code (MAC)
and are efficient in terms of processing time and energy
consumption. However, they suffer from certain issues described in [5] and do not provide a solution. They mainly
focus on providing base station to sensor nodes authentication. Asymmetric schemes using digital signatures overcome the problems of symmetric schemes, nevertheless, it is
more time consuming for the sensor nodes to sign and verify a message than to compute a MAC. Hence, they do not
provide an ideal solution for time critical applications.
The proposed authenticated broadcast by sensor nodes
scheme uses IBOOS which allows a sensor node to perform the most time consuming computations of the signature generation before the message to be signed is known.
Whenever a sensor node has some critical event to report, it
quickly computes the inexpensive online signature and reports the event authentically as soon as possible. Moreover,
OOS allows the offline phase to be performed on some other
resourceful device. So, depending on the nature of the application, it is possible for the base station to perform the
complex computations of the offline phase and distribute the
partial offline signature to the sensor nodes. This will reduce the computation overhead on sensor nodes. The sensor
nodes then only perform the small, energy efficient computations of the online phase. However, this is a trade-off between the computation cost of offline signature and the communication cost. Some IBOOS schemes also allow to reuse
the offline signature to sign more than one message. ID-

based cryptography, on the other hand, handles the problem
of public keys and certificates management in WSNs. For
simplicity, we will use the term broadcast to represent both
broadcast and multicast in the rest of the document.
Organization: Sec. 2 introduces the cryptographic primitives used, Sec. 3 reviews the proposed broadcast by sensor nodes scheme, Sec. 4 describes implementation details
and the results, Sec. 5 discusses the results, Sec. 6 compares
our scheme with the existing signature based authentication
schemes, and Sec. 7 concludes the paper.
2.
2.1

Cryptographic Primitives
ID-based Online/Offline Signature (IBOOS)

Definition 1. An ID-based online/offline signature (IBOOS)
scheme consists of five algorithms as follows:
1. System Setup (SS): Given a security parameter 1k , outputs a master secret key SKPKG and system parameters
SP.
2. Key Extraction (KE): Given a user’s identity IDi and
a master secret key SKPKG , outputs a corresponding
private key DIDi , i.e., DIDi ← KE(IDi , SKPKG ).
3. Offline Signing (OffSign): Given a signing key DIDi †
and system parameters SP, outputs an offline signature
S, i.e., S ← O f f Sign(DIDi , SP).
4. Online Signing (OnSign): Given a message m and an
offline signature S, outputs an online signature σ , i.e.,
σ ← OnSign(m, S).
5. Signature Verification (Ver): Given a message m,
user’s identity IDi , signature σ and system parameters SP, returns 1 if the signature is valid and 0 if not.
Namely, 0/1 ← Ver(m, IDi , σ , SP).
3.

Authenticated Broadcast by Sensor Nodes Scheme

We now present a review of our proposed authenticated
broadcast by sensor nodes scheme using IBOOS, described
in [5]. The first two phases of this schemes i.e., the System
Initialization and the Key Generation are performed once,
before the deployment of the WSN.
System Initialization: In our scheme, the base station
plays the role of PKG, a trustworthy entity, and initializes
the system in this phase. Let SKBS be the secret key of the
base station. The base station computes the corresponding
public key PKBS and sets up the public system parameters
SP which include PKBS . The master secret key SKBS is only
kept by the base station while SP is made public.
Key Generation: In this phase, the base station computes the secret keys of all sensor nodes corresponding to
their IDs using the master secret key SKBS . For a sensor
node i with identity IDi , the corresponding secret key is
DIDi computed as DIDi ← KE(IDi , SKBS ). IDs, corresponding private keys and system parameters are stored on sensor
† For

some IBOOS schemes, the signing key is used in online
phase rather than in offline phase
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nodes before deployment. Hence, every sensor node i stores
{IDi , DIDi , SP}.
Message Broadcast and Authentication: In this
phase, the sensor nodes broadcast authenticated messages
which are verified using their identity information, for instance, ID. The signature generation of a broadcast message
is divided into Offline and Online phases:
Offline phase: The offline phase is performed before
the message to broadcast becomes available. This phase
can be carried out by the base station. The offline signature algorithm runs in this phase and performs most of the
signature computations to calculate the partial signature S as
S ← O f f Sign(DIDi , SP). The resulting offline signature S is
stored on the sensor node i.
Online phase: Whenever the sensor node i senses an
event which requires quick reporting, the online phase starts.
In this phase, the sensor node i retrieves the offline signature
S calculated during the offline phase. The online signature
algorithm runs in this phase on sensor node i and performs
very minor and fast computations to obtain the final signature σ over message m as σ ← OnSign(m, T S, IDi , S). Here
T S is the current time stamp. The final broadcast message
then contains the message m, time stamp T S, identity of the
sensor node IDi and the signature σ i.e., {m, T S, IDi , σ }.
Here T S is included to defeat a message replay attack.
Authentication: On receiving a broadcast message, the
receiver first checks the time stamp T S to avoid the verification of a replayed message. If it is a fresh one, the receiver
further proceeds with the signature verification; otherwise
it discards the message. The receiver verifies the signature
σ using the identity information IDi of the sender node and
other system parameters as 0/1 ← Ver(m, T S, IDi , σ , SP). If
verification succeeds, the receiver accepts the message; otherwise it discards it. If necessary, it rebroadcasts the message to sensor nodes belonging to the next hop.
Sender Revocation: To revoke a compromised sensor
node i, the base station broadcasts its identity IDi to all other
nodes in the network, who store IDi . If in the future a sensor
node receives a message containing IDi , it simply rejects the
message without going through the authentication process.
An adversary is assumed to compromise only a few sensor
nodes in the network. If the adversary compromises a majority of the sensor nodes, all the security mechanisms will
fail. Therefore, storing the IDs of a few compromised nodes
would incur a reasonable storage overhead for sensor nodes.
Moreover, the base station can periodically update system
parameters and secret keys of all legitimate sensor nodes
excluding malicious nodes. However, this update might be
costly. Another possible solution is to manually detach these
compromised sensor nodes from the sensor network.
4.
4.1

Implementation and Evaluation
Choice of IBOOS Schemes

There are many IBOOS schemes available, for example,
based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and RSA sig-

natures. Keeping in mind the security and efficiency requirements, the two different ECC based IBOOS schemes
given in [9] and [11] were selected (reasons behind this selection are described in [5]) for implementation and evaluation purposes. The IBOOS scheme in [9] proposed by
Ren et al. (say R-IBOOS) presents a method to convert an
underlying signature scheme into an online/offline signature
scheme to mitigate phishing attacks. The offline signature
in this scheme can be securely reused to sign more than one
message. This signature scheme is proved to be existentially
unforgeable. Its security depends on the Discrete Logarithm
Problem. Unlike R-IBOOS, the IBOOS scheme presented
in [11] by Xu et al. (say X-IBOOS) provides a direct online/offline signature scheme for authentication in mobile
ad-hoc networks, which does not require another underlying signature scheme. This signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attacks.
To see how efficient these IBOOS schemes would be on sensor nodes, we went for the implementation of these IBOOS
schemes on actual sensor nodes. However, we only implemented X-IBOOS scheme and based on the implementation
results (discussed later in the paper), we decided to skip RIBOOS. For the sake of interest, the details of X-IBOOS
scheme are given in appendix A.
4.2

Implementation Details

For implementation purposes, the hardware platform selected was the standard MICA2 sensor node, a popular
choice among the research community. MICA2 has an integrated ATMEGA 128L micro-controller from the AVR
family having 8-bit processor, 4KB of SRAM, 128KB of
flash memory (ROM) with a clock speed of 7.3828MHz.
Our implementation involves a base station (a laptop with
TinyOS installed) and two MICA2 sensor nodes; one acting as a signer while the other acting as a verifier. However, both nodes have the ability to sign as well as verify the
messages. To perform cryptographic operations, we used
RELIC [12], a publicly available highly efficient library to
implement cryptographic operations on sensor nodes, particularly pairing computation. As both above mentioned
IBOOS schemes required pairing computations, we decided
to go for this library. The security level of ∼80-bit, considered adequate for resource constrained sensor nodes, is
adopted. ηT pairing is chosen to compute pairing operation
as it is the fastest one to compute on resource constrained
sensor nodes and is a best choice at this security level [13].
The Setup and the Extract phases were performed at the base
station. The system parameters and other secret information
were stored on the sensor nodes via the base station. All the
software programs (including online/offline signature code)
running on the sensor nodes for evaluation have been implemented in the NesC language installed on the TinyOS operating system. We developed and tested our programs first on
TOSSIM and Avrora, popular simulation and analysis tools
for MICA micro-controllers. These tools together give the
strength of code development and debugging. These pro-
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grams were then installed on MICA2 sensor nodes. The implementation results are the average of running the code 50
times. Due to the space constraints, we skip the in depth
implementation details here.

one co-ordinate (x) of the group element, as is usually done.
Given x and a single bit of y, the receiver can regenerate y.
However, this is a trade-off between the transmission cost
and the computation cost of deriving y for the receiver.

4.3

4.4.3

Performance Matrices

The primary goal of these experiments was to gather the actual statistics about the resource consumption of an IBOOS
scheme on real sensor nodes and study its performance. In
case of a signature scheme, the primary factors to affect a
sensor node’s resources are signature generation and verification costs (computation cost) and signature size (transmission cost). Therefore, the IBOOS schemes are evaluated
for the following performance matrices: computation cost
(time and energy consumption), signature size, and memory
consumption (ROM/RAM). The transmission cost is proportional to the signature size, thus, we only count the signature size.
4.4

Implementation Results of X-IBOOS Scheme

4.4.1

Computation Cost

X-IBOOS [11] requires two pairing computations in signature verification as the most expensive cryptographic operations. Table 1 shows the time and energy consumption of
this scheme. It took about 1.697s to compute the offline signature while only 0.018s to compute the online part. Thus,
this scheme enables a sensor node to generate a final signature over a real time message in 0.018s only which is quite
fast considering the resource constraints of a sensor node.
However, the verification part of X-IBOOS is very expensive, consuming considerable time and energy† because of
the two expensive pairing computations.
Time (s)

Energy (mW)

Offline Sign
1.697
50.92
Online Sign
0.018
0.54
Verify
5.099
177.01
Table 1 Time and Energy Consumption

4.4.2

Signature Size

A signature in the X-IBOOS scheme is comprised of two
group elements of the form (x, y) and one number. Based
on our selection of ηT pairing and ∼80-bit security level, a
random number takes about 271 bits and a group element is
about 2*271 bits. Therefore, the resulting signature size is
1355 bits or 170 bytes. This signature size can be reduced
up to 102 bytes by applying compression and including only
† Energy consumption is computed using the MICA2 data sheet

[8] and the computed number of clock cycles for each stage.
The power consumption is calculated at 3V power supply and
7.3728MHZ clock frequency.

Memory Consumption

Table 2 summarizes the memory requirement of the XIBOOS scheme including the size of both signature generation and verification codes. It also includes the code size
of RELIC, TinyOS code, node’s ID (16 bits) and private key
(2∗271 bits), master public key (2∗271 bits) and other system parameters. The memory consumption of ROM, Global
RAM and Stack RAM is 63,972, 1,933 and 1911 bytes respectively. This memory consumption can be reduced by
storing only one co-ordinate x of the group elements on sensor node. Given x and a single bit of y, the node can derive
y when it needs. This will reduce the storage consumption
per one group element stored on the sensor node by 270 bits.
The stack memory is consumed only during the execution of
the program, i.e., during the signature generation and verification. Once the program stops execution, this memory is
available for other operations. Note that this is the total storage consumption on a sensor node when a sensor node acts
as both a signer and a verifier. In our proposed broadcast
authentication scheme, a sensor node can act as sender as
well as receiver of broadcast messages.
ROM
63,972
Table 2

4.5

Global RAM

Stack RAM

1,933
1,911
Memory Consumption in Bytes

Optimization

We proposed to evaluate two IBOOS schemes, X-IBOOS
and R-IBOOS, as mentioned above. However, the evaluation results of X-IBOOS scheme depict the fact that pairing based schemes are expensive for sensor nodes in terms
of resource consumptions. Pairing computation consumes
considerable resources on sensor nodes including processing time, battery power and memory. The computation of a
single pairing operation using RELIC takes about 1.9s [13]
and, hence, consumes considerable battery power. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the most efficient implementation of pairing operation for MICA2 sensor nodes. As RIBOOS also requires pairing computation, we can expect the
similar expensive results. Hence, we decided to skip it as we
were looking for IBOOS schemes efficient for sensor nodes.
Our next step was to find a pairing-free IBOOS scheme. Although the application of OOS itself brought the benefit of
quick authenticated broadcast by resource constrained sensor nodes, the existing IBOOS schemes being pairing based
proved expensive for the sensor nodes. To the best of our
knowledge, there are a few ECC based IBS schemes without
pairing but no ECC based IBOOS scheme without pairing.

YASMIN et al.: AN AUTHENTICATION FRAMEWORK FOR WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS USING IDENTITY-BASED SIGNATURES: IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATIO

4.5.1

Bellare et al.’s IBS as IBOOS

The implementation results in Sec. 4.4 proved that by having a pairing-free IBOOS scheme, we could get better results for IBOOS schemes for WSNs. We realized that the
IBS scheme (BNN-IBS) proposed by Bellare et al. [14]
and improved by Cao et al. [15] could be modified as an
IBOOS scheme. BNN-IBS is an ECC based pairing-free
IBS scheme having only one point multiplication as the expensive operation in signature generation. This point multiplication computation, resulting in a partial signature, is
independent of the message to be signed. Thus, it can be
computed as an offline signature before the message to be
signed is known. The rest of the signature generation uses
this offline signature and the message and only performs integer arithmetics to get the final signature of the message.
Integer arithmetics is very efficient for sensor nodes in terms
of time and energy consumption. Operations using integer
arithmetics, performed when the message to be signed is
known, form the online phase of the signature generation.
Thus, BNN-IBS can be computed as an online/offline signature into two phases; offline phase and online phase. The
signature verification in BNN-IBS requires three point multiplications which although are expensive but far less expensive than a single pairing computation for sensor nodes.
Thus, we modified BNN-IBS [15] scheme as IBOOS (say
B-IBOOS) scheme and in next step implemented and evaluated it. For the sake of interest, the details of B-IBOOS are
given in appendix B.
Security of B-IBOOS: The security of BNN-IBS depends
on the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem. Using
BNN-IBS as IBOOS does not affect the security of this signature scheme. It is secure to compute the offline part before
the message is known and store it. If an attacker compromises the sensor node and gets both the offline signature Y
and the random number y used to generate Y , he still would
not be able to get any extra benefits other than the ones obtained by compromising a sensor node. After computing the
final signature, the sensor node deletes both Y and y.
4.6

Implementation Results of B-IBOOS Scheme

The IBS scheme in [15] is actually an improvement over the
BNN-IBS [14] scheme to reduce the signature size. This
improved version of the scheme has been proposed to use in
WSNs as IBS to provide outside user authentication where
sensor nodes are the verifiers. We implemented B-IBOOS
scheme (IBOOS version of [15]) for ∼80-bit security level
and selected the curve parameters accordingly.
4.6.1

Computation Cost

B-IBOOS [11] computes three point multiplication operations in signature verification as expensive cryptographic
operations for sensor nodes. The offline phase is comprised

of only one point multiplication. One point multiplication took 0.295s in our implementation which confirmed the
point multiplication cost obtained by [16], using the same
RELIC library. Table 3 shows the time and energy consumption of this scheme. It took about 0.295s to compute
the offline signature while only 0.025s to compute the online
part. The computation cost of the online phase is almost the
same for both B-IBOOS (Table 3) and X-IBOOS (Table 1)
schemes. Nevertheless, in the offline phase X-IBOOS took
more time and, thus, consumed more energy than B-IBOOS.
The same is the case with the verification phase. B-IBOOS,
being pairing-free, verifies the signature in 1.044s only as
compared to the verification time of 5.099s of X-IBOOS. A
comparison of Table 1 and Table 3 highlights the fact that
B-IBOOS is very efficient for resource constrained sensor
nodes in terms of computation cost when compared with XIBOOS.
Time (s)

Energy (mW)

Offline Sign
0.295
8.85
Online Sign
0.025
0.74
Verify
1.044
31.33
Table 3 Time and Energy Consumption

4.6.2

Signature Size

The signature in B-IBOOS is comprised of one elliptic curve
point of the form (x, y) and two numbers. We used 163-bit
field for ECC to meet the ∼80-bit security level. For these
settings, a random number takes 160 bits while one elliptic
curve point takes 2∗163 bits. Therefore, the resulting signature size is 646 bits (80 bytes) without compression while
484 bits (60 bytes) with compression. This signature size is
much smaller than the one in X-IBOOS scheme and, thus,
results in a reduced transmission cost. IEEE Std. 802.15.4
[17], the standard for the low-power sensor networks, allows a variable payload of up to 102 bytes. With this packet
size, a sensor node still has 22 bytes available to include ID
and the message m, other than uncompressed 80 bytes of the
signature, to send them all together in a single packet. The
messages exchanged to report any critical event, for instance
the location of enemy, are usually short in size up to a few
bytes. Therefore, 22 bytes provide enough space for both
ID and the message m.
4.6.3

Memory Consumption

Table 4 shows the memory requirement of B-IBOOS
scheme. Like X-IBOOS (Table 2), it also includes the
memory consumed by the signature generation and verification code, RELIC code, TinyOS code, node’s ID (16 bits)
and private key (160 bits), master public key (2∗163 bits)
and other system parameters. For B-IBOOS, ROM, Global
RAM and Stack RAM consume 47,798, 1,902 and 1,821
bytes respectively. This memory consumption can also be
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reduced by storing only one co-ordinate x of the elliptic
curve points of the form (x, y). This reduces the memory
consumption per one elliptic curve point stored on the sensor node by 162 bits. The memory consumed by the stack is
returned once the program completes its execution. Like in
the case of X-IBOOS, this is the total storage consumption
on a sensor node when a sensor node acts as both a signer
and a verifier. Compared with the memory consumption in
X-IBOOS (Table 2), the ROM consumption is lower in BIBOOS than X-IBOOS while the Global RAM consumption is almost the same in both schemes. The stack usage
is slightly lower in B-IBOOS than X-IBOOS. However, the
overall RAM consumption of B-IBOOS scheme is slightly
smaller than the RAM consumption in X-IBOOS scheme.
ROM
47,798
Table 4

4.7

Global RAM

Stack RAM

1,902
1,821
Memory Consumption in Bytes

Optimization

In the light of the results we obtained for computation cost,
signature size and memory consumption of both schemes,
X-IBOOS and B-IBOOS, it is clear that B-IBOOS scheme
outperforms X-IBOOS in terms of computation cost and signature size. The memory usage, however, does not make a
big difference in both schemes. One factor, which is contributing towards the memory usage in B-IBOOS, is that
RELIC uses a precomputed table to fasten the computation
of point multiplication for ECC based schemes. This precomputed table is also stored and consumes some memory
space on the sensor node. To optimize B-IBOOS scheme
for the memory consumption, we decided to evaluate this
scheme without the precomputed table of RELIC. It restrained us from using one efficient RELIC function used
to compute the point addition of the two point multiplications, i.e., (aP + bQ). Table 5 and Table 6 show the results
obtained after removing the precomputed table of RELIC.
Time (s)

Energy (mW)

Offline Sign
0.317
9.52
Online Sign
0.025
0.74
Verify
1.118
33.54
Table 5 Time and Energy Consumption

ROM
45,612
Table 6

Global RAM

Stack RAM

1,634
1,381
Memory Consumption in Bytes

Compared with Table 3 and Table 4, avoiding the precomputed table reduces the memory consumption of BIBOOS scheme, particularly the RAM consumption. Although it slightly increases the time and energy consumptions of the offline phase and the signature verification

phase, this increment is not a drastic change. It is an acceptable trade-off between the computation cost and the memory
usage giving 10% of free memory. However, it depends on
the nature of the application whether it can compromise on
speed or memory.
5.

Discussion

Our implementation results obtained in Sec. 4 strengthened
the idea of using online/offline signatures for resource constrained sensor nodes. The X-IBOOS scheme proved expensive for the sensor nodes, consuming considerable resources. The reason behind this was not the online/offline
signature itself but the expensive pairing based cryptography. The implementation results of B-IBOOS proved this
argument. Hence, if we use pairing-free ECC based IBOOS
schemes we can obtain better results.
Moreover, the two implementations of B-IBOOS offer
a trade-off between the computation cost and the memory
usage. Memory can be saved by removing the precomputed
table and slightly increasing the computation time. However, this can be decided depending on the type of application. The offline signature is computed before the message to be signed is available and the online phase takes the
same time in both implementations, i.e., 0.025s. Therefore,
the time to compute the final signature, once the message
is known, is the same in both cases. For time critical applications, it is reasonable to use the first implementation
of B-IBOOS if the receiver is a sensor node, and the second
implementation of B-IBOOS if the receiver is a powerful device. Broadcast of a message by a sensor node is not a very
frequent event in time critical applications, for instance, forest fire alarm application. In forest fire alarm application, a
message is sent by a sensor node only when a fire is set up
somewhere in the forest. Signing and verifying a message
occasionally only in critical situations is not very expensive
for the sensor nodes. Moreover, if the offline phase is performed on the base station and the resulting offline signature
is stored on the sensor node, it can further reduce the computation overhead on the sensor nodes. X-IBOOS can also
be useful for such applications of WSNs where the offline
signature is computed and stored by the base station on the
sensor nodes and the signature verifier is a powerful device.
6.

Comparison with Existing Authentication Schemes

Now we will compare our proposed broadcast authentication scheme using IBOOS with the existing signature based
authentication schemes [15], [18], [19] for WSNs. We could
not find the exact implementation results of these schemes
for WSNs. However, using the most efficient results of pairing, point multiplication and elliptic curve digital signature
algorithm (ECDSA) costs on MICA2 and ignoring all other
costs including hash computations, we roughly estimate the
time cost of these schemes for comparison purposes. A
point multiplication operation on MICA2 takes 0.30s [16],
pairing operation takes 1.9s [13], signature generation and
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verification for ECDSA take 0.36s and 0.63s respectively
[16]. Using these results, Table 7 gives the comparison. The
message size includes both the signature size as well as the
public key (20 bytes for ECDSA) for the first scheme while
only the signature size for all other schemes.
Schemes

Sign. Time
(Offline) s
(Online) s

Verif. Time
s

Message Size
bytes

Existing Broadcast Authentication Schemes
0
0.36
2*0.63
60
0
0.36
0.63
40
0
2.2
5.7
84 [19]
0
0.32
1.044
80
Proposed Broadcast Authentication Scheme
Proposed
0.295
0.025
1.044
80
Table 7 Comparison of proposed broadcast authentication scheme using
B-IBOOS with the existing broadcast authentication schemes for WSNs.
CAS [19]
DAS [19]
IDS [18]
IMBAS [15]

The first two schemes CAS and DAS [19] propose to
use ECDSA to sign a message. CAS requires the signer’s
public key and certificate to be sent with every signed message, increasing transmission overhead. The receiver verifies two ECDSA signatures for every message; one to verify
the signed certificate and other to verify the signed message.
DAS, on the other hand, requires all sensor nodes to store
the public keys of every sender in the network increasing
storage overhead. For a large scale network, it is not possible for a sensor node having a limited storage capability to
store the public key of every other sensor node in the network. Signature generation in IDS [18] comprises one pairing and one point multiplication computations while signature verification involves two pairing computations and one
exponentiation in GT . The exponentiation in GT (say ET ) is
more expensive than the exponentiation in G1 (say E1 ) (E1
is equivalent to one point multiplication). However, we only
consider two pairing computations and one point multiplication (for ET ) as signature verification cost for this scheme.
IMBAS [15] proposes BNN-IBS for sensor networks where
sensor nodes are only receivers (verifiers).
The figures in Table 7 show that the proposed authentication scheme using IBOOS scheme enables a sensor node
to sign a message in 0.025s only as compared to the existing schemes which take significantly longer. In signature verification, only DAS takes less time than the proposed scheme but increases the storage overhead of storing senders public keys beyond the storage capability of the
sensor nodes. Based on these results, we conclude that the
proposed scheme using IBOOS is the most efficient scheme
for time critical applications of WSNs when compared with
the existing signature based authentication schemes. It also
allows the base station to compute the offline signature on
behalf of a sensor node, reducing computation overhead on
them. With this implementation work, we have completed
one part of our proposed framework [5], i.e., the scheme of
authenticated broadcast by sensor nodes.
7.

Conclusion

In this paper, we presented the implementation evaluation

of our previously proposed IBOOS signature based authentication scheme on MICA2 sensor nodes. We assessed the
cost incurred by using two different IBOOS schemes for resource constrained sensor nodes. We first implemented and
evaluated one pairing based IBOOS scheme named as XIBOOS. For optimization purposes, we also converted the
well-known pairing-free BNN-IBS scheme into an IBOOS
scheme and implemented it on MICA2 sensor nodes. The
implementation results show the suitability of IBOOS for
WSNs. In future, we are going to focus on the session key
establishment between the outsider user and the sensor node
after successful user authentication, i.e., the second authentication scheme of the proposed framework.
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• Compute I’s private key as si = r + cx.
Signature Generation. I with identity IDi signs a message
m in two phases as follows:
OffSign. The Offline phase is performed before the message
to be signed is known.
• Choose at random y ∈ Z p and compute Y = yP.
The offline signature is (y,Y ).
OnSign. The Online phase is performed after the message
becomes available.
• Compute h = H2 (IDi , m, Ri , Y )
• Compute z = y + hsi .
The tuple hRi , h, zi is I’s signature on message m.

Appendix A:

X-IBOOS Scheme

Setup. The system parameters generated are (G1 , G2 , P,
Ppub , H0 , H1 ). Here G1 is a cyclic additive group generated
by P with a prime order q. G2 is a cyclic multiplicative
group with same order q. Let ê : G1 × G1 → G2 be a bilinear
mapping with the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: ê(aP, bQ) = ê(P, Q)ab for all P, Q ∈ G1 ,
a, b ∈ Zq .
2. Non-degeneracy: There exists P, Q ∈ G1 such that
ê(P, Q) 6= 1.
3. Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to
compute ê(P, Q) for all P, Q ∈ G1 .
For a random number s ∈ Zq∗ , the master public key is Ppub
= sP, H0 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 and H1 : {0, 1}∗ × G1 → Zq∗ . The
master secret key is s which is kept secret.

Signature Verification. Given hRi , h, zi, IDi and the message m, the receiver verifies the signature as:
• Compute c = H1 (IDi kRi )
• Check whether the following equation holds.
h = H2 (IDi , m, Ri , zP - h(Ri + cP0 ))
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Extract. Given an identity ID, the corresponding private
key DID is computed as DID = sH0 (ID) and QID = H0 (ID).
OffSign. Pick two random numbers r, x ∈ Zq∗ , output the
offline signature pair (S, R), where S = 1r DID and R = xP.
OnSign. Given a message m, compute the online signature
as σ = H1 (m, R)x + r. The resulting signature is a triple
hσ , S, Ri.
Verify. Check whether (Ppub , σ P − H1 (m, R)R, S, QID ) is a
valid Diffie-Hellman tuple.
Appendix B:
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B-IBOOS Scheme

Setup. The system parameters are (E/Fq , P, p, P0 , H1 , H2 ).
Here E is an elliptic curve over a prime finite field Fq . The
order of E(Fq ) is m. p is a prime number with p2 ∤ m, P ∈
E(Fq ) is a point of order p and G is a group generated by P.
For a master secret key x ∈ Z p , the master public key is P0 =
xP. H1 = {0, 1} × G∗ → Z p and H2 = {0, 1}∗ → Z p .
Key Extraction. Given and identity IDi of a user I, the
corresponding private key is generated as
• Choose at random r ∈ Z p and compute Ri = rP.
• Compute c = H1 (IDi kRi ).
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